Navigating Human Rights in a ‘Post-Human Rights’ Era by Smith, Rhona & Molloy, Sean
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Smith, Rhona and Molloy, Sean (2020) Navigating Human Rights in a ‘Post-Human Rights’ 
Era. Asia Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law, 21 (2). pp. 139-194. ISSN 1388-1906 
Published by: Brill Academic Publishers
URL: https://doi.org/10.1163/15718158-21020001 <https://doi.org/10.1163/15718158-21020001>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/45739/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
This  document  may differ  from the  final,  published version of  the research  and has been made 
available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version 
of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.)
                        
1 
 
Navigating Human Rights in a ‘Post-Human Rights’ Era: Mapping the Terrain 
through the lens of ASEAN States 
Rhona Smith* and Sean Molloy**1 
International human rights law and mechanisms tasked with promoting state compliance with it are 
being increasingly challenged. Opposition is originating from, amongst others, countries that have 
historically supported the global rights project. These new trends and sites of contestation bolster 
opposition from other countries and regions that have consistently diverged from international 
human rights norms. Examining the relationship between the United Nations human rights system 
and states of the Association of South East Asian Nations in this broader context of opposition to 
human rights, this paper argues that existing theories on why states do, or ought to, comply with 
international human rights law are often inadequate to either explain or inspire state adherence to 
human rights norms. What is required, this paper will argue, is not another theory but rather more 
targeted and incremental efforts to address the gap between rhetoric and compliance. 
Keywords: ASEAN states, Human Rights, Post-Human Rights Era, United Nations, Treaties 
Across the globe, governments are manifesting an aversion to globalisation and multilateralism and 
in their place promoting nationalism, state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. 
Human rights have also come under attack, frequently presented in disparaging terms as 
constituting liberal ideals, promoted by ‘globalists’, and used to safeguard the rights of ‘others’, such 
as terrorists or migrants.2 Some now speak of a ‘post-human rights era’, a term coined to capture a 
growing discontent with the global rights project.3 As opposition ebbs and flows, questions arise 
regarding the place of contemporary and future human rights. In particular, uncertainty surrounds 
the approaches that those mechanisms tasked with promoting state adherence to international 
human rights norms adopt in contexts where the very ideas that they attempt to advance are 
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viewed with suspicion.4 For those countries traditionally opposed to or sceptical of the global rights 
project, this emerging push back arguably galvanises and bolsters pre-existing concerns.  
This paper grapples with the implications of this global pushback in a region in which some States 
historically have shown reluctance to embrace the global rights project. To do so, this paper 
examines the relationship between the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states and 
the United Nations (UN) human rights machinery. Many ASEAN states have exhibited reluctance to 
engage with the global rights project. This aversion presents itself in varying levels of ratification of 
international human rights treaties and reservations.5 ASEAN states have limited their engagement 
with UN treaty bodies, with few committing to the individual complaints mechanisms as well as 
many submitting (or failing to submit) overdue periodic reports. There is also a degree of suspicion, 
at times even outright opposition, directed towards the Human Rights Council’s (HRC) Special 
Procedures.  
Section 1 draws on these issues to map evidence of resistance to international human rights 
monitoring. Section 2 then considers reasons for this.  Emerging from periods of colonialism and 
conflict, ASEAN states have sought to promote a particular approach to human rights, one that 
champions ‘Asian’ over claimed ‘universal’ values, protects national sovereignty and, with that, the 
supremacy of national law. Against this backdrop, there is a useful body of literature that attempts 
to understand how states, including those that have opposed the global rights project, nevertheless 
adhere to international human rights standards. From fields such as law, sociology, history and 
international relations, explanations rooted in realism, institutionalism, liberalism and acculturation, 
amongst others, have sought to examine how a range of actors incentivise, coerce, shame and 
persuade states to adhere to international human rights norms. This paper seeks to examine these 
theories in Section 3 demonstrating that ASEAN’s approach to universal human rights is increasingly 
strengthened by the adoption of similar push back by other states in the post-human rights era, 
including some that previously challenged the region’s approach to human rights. This renders 
existing theoretical arguments ill-adept at explaining or inspiring compliance in the current context. 
In response, Section 4 offers several specific recommendations to help address the growing 
scepticism of the global rights project and attempts to undermine the very idea of international 
human rights law and its mechanisms.   
1.  ASEAN and human rights systems  
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This section examines ASEAN member states’ interaction with the international human rights 
system. After briefly introducing the ASEAN approach to human rights, it demonstrates that the 
region has an at times precarious relationship with the UN system of human rights protection. This 
discussion enables an exploration as to why ASEAN countries seem reluctant to fully commit to 
international human rights and monitoring mechanisms.  
(a) The Origins of the ASEAN Human Rights System  
ASEAN was formed on 8 August 1967 with five-member states – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. It was born out of dispute resolution negotiations between Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Malaysia, brokered by Thailand.6 Forty years after the 1967 Bangkok Declaration 
establishing ASEAN, the now ten member states adopted the 2007 ASEAN Charter as the legal and 
institutional framework for the organisation.7 This bound members to an ambitious programme of 
integration, including the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015, plans for a single market 
and production base, as well as greater political, security, economic, education and socio-cultural 
cooperation.8 The ASEAN community consists of three communities: the ASEAN Political–Security 
Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. 
While neither human rights and democracy nor good governance were mentioned in the 1967 
Bangkok Declaration that established ASEAN,9 human rights’ increased prevalence internationally 
influenced the region and, unsurprisingly, rights are prominent in the 2007 ASEAN Charter.10 Article 
1 proclaims the purposes of the organisation as enhancing peace, security and stability, alleviating 
poverty, strengthening democracy, good governance and the rule of law, promoting and protecting 
human rights, transboundary cooperation, combatting drugs and transboundary challenges.11 It also 
adds an unequivocal human rights dimension to the work and focus of the organisation – Article 
2(2)(i) of the General Principles binding member states notes ‘respect for fundamental freedoms, 
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the promotion and protection of human rights and the promotion of social justice’.12 An ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was inaugurated in 200913 with its 
purpose, inter alia, to, ‘uphold international human rights standards as prescribed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and international 
human rights instruments to which ASEAN Member States are parties.’14 In addition, ASEAN has also 
created entities working directly on human rights issues such as women and children, and migrant 
workers.15 
As part of the AICHR’s work and one of its most notable achievements to date, the working group 
drafted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), adopted in 2012.16 The Declaration covers a 
broad range of rights and freedoms, many of which mirror, or are similar, to those found in 
international human rights standards. As examples, Articles 10 and 26 of the AHRD provide that 
ASEAN Member States affirm all of the civil and political rights and all of the economic, social and 
cultural rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as well as the specific rights 
listed in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Articles 3 and 5 of the Declaration, concerning the 
right to recognition before the law and the right to an enforceable remedy, are identical to Articles 6 
and 8 of the UDHR. Rights not included in the UDHR were added, including ‘the right to a safe, clean 
and sustainable environment’17 and the ‘right to development … so as to meet equitably the 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations”.18  
Many commentators view the ASEAN human rights system as deeply flawed, with a number of areas 
reflecting an ASEAN specific rather than universal and international approach to human rights.19 
Certainly its styling on the more general aspirational UDHR raises issues of enforceability. China too 
has advocated the development of human rights, predicated on non-interference and sovereignty, 
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undermining the concept of universalism, human rights with ‘Chinese characteristics’.20 China’s 
support for many ASEAN states, notable in public statements during universal periodic review and 
interactive dialogues with special procedures, reiterates its emphasis on advancing human rights in 
light of national conditions and needs.21  
(b) ASEAN states and international human rights obligations  
International human rights instruments serve as legal sources for international human rights law and 
the protection of human rights in general.22 There are nine core treaties- the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD), the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),23 
the Migrant Workers’ Convention (CMW),24 the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),25 
the Convention Against Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment 
(CAT),26 the Convention on Enforced Disappearances (CED27) and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).28 These are augmented by optional protocols offering additional 
rights29 and/or monitoring mechanisms.30  
All ASEAN states are party to two or more of the core UN international human rights treaties, as 
Table 1 lists. In some cases, high levels of ratification exist. Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines 
have each ratified 8 of the core 9 human rights treaties: the Philippines and Indonesia have not yet 
ratified the CED; Cambodia has not yet ratified the CMW. Taking a regional overview, all ASEAN 
states have ratified the CRC, CEDAW and the CRPD.  At the other end of the spectrum, Brunei 
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Darussalam and Malaysia have only ratified those 3 core treaties. Other regional states have not 
ratified the ICCPR (Myanmar, Singapore), ICESCR (Singapore) and CAT (Singapore).  Lao, Thailand and 
VietNam have each ratified seven, Myanmar and Singapore four, core treaties. Only Cambodia has 
ratified CED. 
Notwithstanding levels of ratification, ASEAN states also issue a relatively high number of 
reservations to these treaties.31 4 out of the 6 ASEAN states that have ratified that ICCPR have 
included reservations (Indonesia, Lao, Thailand and VietNam), while 5 out of the 10 ASEAN states 
have entered reservations to CEDAW (Brunei; Indonesia; Myanmar; Thailand; VietNam). 4 out of 7 
states that have ratified the ICESCR (Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand and VietNam) and CERD 
(Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and VietNam) have included reservations while all 10 ASEAN states 
have submitted reservations to the CRC-OP-AC.  
Existing research highlights the differences between policy and practice, arguing that human rights 
treaties are, at times, ineffectual as drivers of changes to domestic practice.32 Of course, states 
accept international human rights treaty obligations for a variety of reasons and ratification does not 
necessarily indicate government support for the terms of the treaty or a commitment to 
implementation of those terms at the national level.33  Drawing from the field of sociology and 
insights from institutionalist theory, this is often explained as ‘decoupling’, which refers to the 
divergences between state commitments under treaty ratification and the actual practices of states 
domestically.34 Commitment and compliance sit on the continuum not only in legal terms (uberrimae 
fidei and pacta sund servanda) but also in human rights terms. Commitment to human rights is a 
promise to respect human rights and freedoms. Thereafter, moving to full compliance, states will 
actively promote and protect human rights in laws and policies in further steps to fully realise their 
paper commitments.35 Human rights rhetorical treaty commitments thus become a positive reality.36 
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One of the central indicators of adherence to international human rights treaties is how human 
rights are protected within a state. 
Differences between ratification and compliance are not hard to find in ASEAN states. By way of 
examples, in Myanmar, human rights defenders are under constant threat due to the country’s 
corrupt judiciary practices and weak rule of law;37 Indonesia has been criticised as Indonesian 
President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo ‘…failed to translate his rhetorical support for human rights into 
meaningful policies during his first term in office.’38 Cambodia held a general election in July 2018 
amid condemnation over the ruling Cambodian People’s Party’s detention of opposition leaders and 
the dissolution of the country’s main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party, by court 
order in 2017;39 Brunei Darussalam was criticised in 2019 for introducing the final phase of 
restrictive Islamic laws;40 and the Philippines continue to be criticised for their crackdown on drugs 
and repeated claims of extra-judicial killings.41 Davies has analysed the fulfilment of core human 
rights treaties within ASEAN states following the adoption of the ASEAN Declaration, concluding that 
the ‘gulf between ratified standards and actual compliance, whilst varying amongst ASEAN 
members, is ubiquitous’.42 
While some ASEAN states clearly subscribe to international human rights treaties in principle, 
differences in practice, coupled with extensive use of reservations and reluctance of some states to 
ratify all core international human rights treaties, undermines ASEAN engagement with international 
system.43 The ambivalent engagement of ASEAN states is further demonstrated by their reluctance 
to accept or comply with many aspects of UN human rights machinery.  
(i) ASEAN states’ engagement with UN treaty bodies 
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At present, there are ten treaty bodies of which nine monitor the implementation of the core 
international human rights treaties and one, the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture (SPT), 
executes the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.44 Treaty Bodies’ methods of work 
include three main components: periodic review of states’ compliance; general comments; and 
individual communication mechanisms. Through General Comments,45 treaty bodies can elaborate 
on the specific content of a particular treaty to which they are attached, helping to develop the 
conceptual and practical parameters of the substance of a right or processes necessary to give effect 
to a right. They are intended to guide the interpretation and application of treaties, by explaining the 
approach and understanding of the committee to the rights and freedoms. However, in practice, 
general comments are given little consideration by the courts and tribunals of ASEAN countries.46 
For this reason, the discussion below focuses primarily on concluding observations and individual 
communications.  
Concluding Observations  
The primary mandate of all the committees, except the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, is 
to review the reports submitted periodically by State parties in accordance with the treaties’ 
provisions, evaluating the extent to which accepted human rights obligations are realized within 
each territory.47 Each State party is under an obligation to submit regular reports to the relevant 
treaty body on how the rights are being implemented. Before the session at which it will formally 
consider a report, committee secretariat and members draw up a list of key issues, which is 
submitted to the State party. This list of issues also enables the committee to begin the process of 
questioning the State party in more detail on specific issues raised by the report which are of 
concern to members.  
To assist with this task, the committee may peruse information submitted by non-governmental 
organisations.48 Each state report is considered in a meeting between the state’s delegation and the 
committee. Concluding observations of the committee are then published – these indicate areas of 
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good practice in the state and areas in which improvement could be made.49 The State then works 
on implementing recommendations and commitments. After a specified interval,50 the state submits 
the next report as the cycle/spiral of review continues ad infinitum. Concluding observations 
represent the views of independent experts and have considerable value not least as barometers of 
compliance and indications of problems. They are, in theory, particularly useful at identifying areas 
of lagging state performance in respect of the various individual treaties.51 The issuance of 
concluding observations, according to Flaherty, ‘provides an opportunity for the delivery of an 
authoritative overview of the state of human rights in a country and for the delivery of forms of 
advice which can stimulate systemic improvements.’.52 
Nevertheless, the reporting system is beset by challenges, most prominently the lack of conformity 
to the indicative timescale. Many states submit late compounding the delay caused by the backlog of 
reports awaiting consideration by each committee. Whilst in some ways the system is a victim of its 
own success, it means that although the reviews are generally thorough and increasingly 
comprehensive, they are somewhat irregular.53 For example, the UN Committee on CRC operates on 
a cycle of five year reviews.54 Brunei Darussalam, to choose a random example from ASEAN, was last 
considered by the Committee in 2016.55 This was its combined second and third reports due on 25 
January 2008 and submitted on 12 November 2013. Its fourth to sixth combined report is due June 
2021.  Similar positions are reflected across the other high contracting parties.56 The position is 
markedly worse with CERD, a treaty that imposes the shortest periodicity of reports – two years.57  
Looking at the record of the Philippines, which ratified the treaty in the early years, the country is 
now in its twenty-second reporting cycle and increasingly tardy in submitting reports with its last 
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October 1997 was submitted 5 February 2002; and its third and fourth combined report was due 4 October 2007, yet 
submitted 22 October 2010. This last report was considered in June 2014, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding Observations on Indonesia’s combined third and fourth periodic reports, UN Doc CRC/C/IDN/CO/3-4.  
57
 Article 9(1)(b) International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination. Its combined fifth and 
sixth report, due October 2019, has yet to be submitted. 
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concluding observations issued eight years ago.58 Of course, the growth in high contracting states to 
the treaty was not matched by additional funding and support for the committees.  2019 brought 
the threat, since abated, of reduced numbers of meetings of treaty bodies due to the OHCHR 
funding crisis59  whilst 2020 brought the necessary move online of treaty work pursuant to the 
Covid19 crisis. 2019 also heralded the introduction of a fixed schedule of regular periodic reviews for 
the Human Rights Committee (reviewing ICCPR).60 
It is axiomatic that the backlog in considering reports, combined with tardiness in submission, 
decreases the effectiveness of the review process and the timeliness of any identified problem 
areas.61 For ASEAN (and other) states, scepticism over the effectiveness of the process can prevail 
with echoes of the consensus conciliatory approach of ASEAN as an organisation. After all, the 
strongest critics of ASEAN states’ human rights performance in the region are NGOs,62 INGOs63 and 
the ASEAN MPs interest grouping,64 rather than ASEAN institutions.  
Individual Communications  
Each core treaty now also offers an option for States to recognize the competence of the committee 
to receive individual communications, enabling individuals to submit complaints to any treaty body 
alleging violations of the treaty by the state concerned. The basic concept of complaint mechanisms 
under the human rights treaties is that anyone may bring a non-vexatious complaint against a State 
party alleging a violation of treaty rights following completion of any viable and appropriate 
domestic appeal process. Currently, eight of the human rights treaty bodies (CCPR, CERD, CAT, 
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 Its first report was due 4 January 1970, and submitted 24 March 1970; its second 4 January 1972, submitted 10 February 
1972; its third 4 January 1974, submitted 25 February 1974; its fourth due 4 January 1976, submitted 23 July 1976; its fifth 
due 4 January 1978, submitted 23 January 1978. Then the schedule goes a little awry. Its seventh report was due 4 January 
1980, but submitted more than two years late, on 29 January 1982; its combined 8-10th report was due 2 January 1984, 
though submitted 12 July 1985. A combined 9-14th report was scheduled for submission on 2 January 1990, yet only 
submitted 21 February 1997 and the 15-20th was due 4 January 2006, but submitted 30 June 2008, with concluding 
observations in 2009.  This is the latest concluding observations on the Philippines, not especially satisfactory when the 
reporting cycle is biennial as this is now 2020. The combined 21-22 periodic report, scheduled for 4 January 2012 is not yet 
submitted so will no doubt be combined with additional by now overdue reports. Information from the treaty body 
database - https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/countries.aspx . 
59
 For the statement of the ten chairs of the treaty bodies, see 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24621&LangID=E     
60
 On predictable review cycle, see https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/PredictableReviewCycle.aspx  
61
 The treaty bodies now use a ‘list of issues’ stage in the reporting cycle to afford states the chance of responding to 
specific questions shortly before appearing in dialogue with the committee – this can be used to obtain more up-to-date 
information or data and to clarify new laws and policies. 
62
 NGOs and civil society organisations vary from state to state. 
63
 Some monitor ASEAN states from one or more jurisdiction in the region; others are based overseas; others have offices 
in several states. Specific human rights INGOs include Human Rights Watch and FIDH (International Federation for Human 
Rights). 
64
 ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), formed in 2013, regularly speak out on human rights issues – see 
generally, https://aseanmp.org/homepage.  
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CEDAW, CRPD, CED, CESCR and CRC) may, under certain conditions, receive and consider individual 
complaints or communications from individuals.65  
Notwithstanding the potential for treaty bodies to hold states accountable for human rights 
conflagrations, ASEAN states acceptance of the individual communications process has been 
limited.66 Table 2 demonstrates those ASEAN states that accept the competence of treaty bodies to 
hear individual complaints. The Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia each accept individual 
communications in respect of CEDAW; Thailand also accepts individual communications under the 
third protocol to CRC; and the Philippines accepts individual communications in respect of ICCPR. 
Within the region, the Philippines has received most communications to date through the UN treaty 
processes. A series of communications concerning the Philippines have been brought before the 
Human Rights Committee: most concern fair trial rights and investigations into deaths implicating 
the state.67  Overall, however, the communication procedures have not been well used by victims of 
human rights violations in the Philippines, Cambodia or Thailand. This can be due, in part, to a lack of 
awareness amongst potential authors of communications as well as to approaches to courts and 
quasi-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms. In the region, recourse to non-judicial, often informal, 
mechanisms for dispute resolution is common. However, southeast Asia is not too dissimilar in this 
respect to the practice of other states where, even when accepted, recourse to individual 
communications is at best sporadic. 
In addition to the individual complaints process, it also worth noting that some treaty bodies can be 
recognised as competent to visit accepting states for the purpose of investigating the human rights 
situation. These can be conducted under CAT,68 CED,69 CEDAW-OP,70 CESCR-OP,71 CRC-OP-IC,72 and 
CRPD-OP.73 Some ASEAN member states submit to additional monitoring systems under the UN 
treaties as Table 3 notes: inquiries/investigations. There have been visits and reports under these 
procedures74 but their impact is difficult to extrapolate as the reports are not necessarily made 
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 The procedure for the Convention on Migrant Workers has not yet secured sufficient ratifications to enter into force. 
66
 For an overview of global acceptance of individual communications, see 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/HRIndicators/IndividualCommunications_map.pdf  
67
 See Human Rights Committee opinions on communications recorded in UN Docs CCPR/C/99/D/1559/2007; 
CCPR/C/98/D/1619/2007; CCPR/C/94/D/1560/2007; CCPR/C/92/D/1466/2006; for full list, see 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=En&CountryID=137. 
68
 Art.20, Inquiry procedure under the Convention against Torture. 
69
 Art.33, Inquiry procedure under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance. 
70
 Art. 8-9, Inquiry procedure under the Optional protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. 
71
Art.11, Inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 
72
 Art.13, Inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child/ 
73
 Art.6-7, Inquiry procedure under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
74
 see http://www.ohchr.org under countries for the relevant documentation. 
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public.75 As developed below, whereas these mechanisms adopt a distinctly confrontational 
approach whereby states are held accountable by treaty bodies, ASEAN promotes a distinctively 
non-confrontational approach. As with the UN Special Procedures (discussed below), this approach 
appears to set ASEAN states on a collision course with those mechanisms, which, by their nature, 
seek to ensure that states comply with international standards, shining a spotlight on those that do 
not.  
 (ii) ASEAN states’ engagement with UN Special Procedures 
The Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council are independent human rights experts 
appointed by the HRC with mandates to report, monitor and advise on human rights from a 
thematic or country-specific perspective.76 The Human Rights Council reviews country-specific 
mandates annually77 and thematic mandates every three years.78 Generally, in the process of 
carrying out their mandates, special procedures may, amongst other things, undertake in-person 
country visits to assess human rights violations, make recommendations to States for preventing, 
ending, or remedying violations, and raise awareness of human rights issues.  
Historically, ASEAN states have been reluctant to recognise or engage with Special Procedures, partly 
owing to the criticisms levelled towards the Human Rights Council’s predecessor- the UN 
Commission on Human Rights. The Commission was considered too heavily exposed to political 
influence.79 Many developed countries criticized it because human rights-violating countries could 
secure election to it and thus block condemnation of violations in their own countries and 
elsewhere.80 There were accusations of double standards and unprofessionalism,81 with the 
Commission on Human Rights described by some as ‘a club where friendships easily overlooked 
wrongdoing’.82 
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  Cambodia has hosted two visits by the Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Torture (2-11 December 2009 and 9-13 
December 2015), neither of which have been made public; the Philippines visit of 25 May-3 June 2015 also remains 
confidential. In contrast, the CEDAW inquiry on the Philippines is public – UN Doc CEDAW/C/OP.8/PHL/1. 
76
 See Aoife Nolan, Rosa Freedman, and Thérèse Murphy (eds.), The United Nations Special Procedures System (Brill, Nijhoff 
2017). 
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 Note that Cambodia has agreed to a series of biennial renewals of its country rapporteur. 
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 Note that Cambodia has supported the pen holder state Japan in adopting a biennial renewals of its technical assistance 
and capacity building mandate. 
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 Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom – Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (March 21, 2005), A/59/2005; 
Martin Edwards et al., ‘Sins of Commission? Understanding Membership Patterns on the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission’ (2008) 61 Political Research Quarterly 390. 
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 Karen E. Smith ‘The European Union at the Human Rights Council: speaking with one voice but having little influence’ 
(2010) 17 J. Eur. Public Policy 224. 
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(2006) 7 Melb. J. Int. Law 185, at 187. 
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In 2012, the relationship between ASEAN and special procedures fractured when a group of special 
rapporteurs sent an open letter criticising the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights for failing to 
comply with international human rights standards.83 In recent years, however, the number of visits 
of special procedures to South East Asia has increased as well as continuing visits to the region of the 
Special Rapporteurs with country mandates (Cambodia and Burma/Myanmar). When Myanmar has 
denied access to its country mandate holder, information gathering has taken place in neighbouring 
states in the region.84 Myanmar did not accept the Fact Finding Mission established by the Council 
either.85 Nevertheless, ASEAN states can be hesitant to accept visits by holders of deemed  
“protection” mandates, such as the Special Rapporteur on torture, the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial killings, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, or the Working 
Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances and the Working Group on arbitrary detention. 
Special procedure visits that are accepted by ASEAN states are usually those related to economic, 
social and cultural rights, or to the right to development. Countries such as Singapore and Brunei 
Darussalam systematically decline to accept visits by special procedures.86 ASEAN states are 
sometimes co-sponsors of thematic resolutions (including those establishing or renewing special 
procedure mandates), but rarely exercise a leadership role.  
A Precarious Relationship with the UN?  
Thus, there are varying levels of South East Asian states engagement with the international human 
rights system and it is acknowledged that these issues are not ASEAN specific but characterise the 
approaches from countries around the world. In some cases, ratification levels are high but often 
accompanied by reservations limiting the application of the relevant treaties. As alluded to above, 
neither ratification nor a lack of reservations necessarily entails compliance with international 
human rights standards. To promote compliance, the international system has developed a range of 
mechanisms, some of which have been discussed above. However, as with ratification, there are 
differences in respects of how ASEAN member states engage. A lack of acceptance of individual 
complaints process, coupled with a relatively limited engagement with the reporting and hesitancy 
to support the work of special procedures, demonstrates ASEAN reticence.  
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 UN experts raise concerns over ‘landmark’ Southeast Asian human rights declaration, 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/11/425852. 
84
 Myanmar has not engaged with the Special Rapporteur since 2017; see 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22553 ; see also report of the Special 
Rapporteur A/72/382. 
85
 Established by resolution A/HRC/34/22; Final report A/HRC/39/64 at para 3 regretted the lack of cooperation from the 
government including no entry to the country. 
86
 For the list of countries extending standing invitations to special procedures, see 
https://spinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/SpecialProceduresInternet/StandingInvitations.aspx .  
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2. Examining ASEAN ‘Push back’ against universal human rights  
In this section, we consider some of the reasons for opposition to, and only partial engagement with, 
the international rights regime, particularly from ASEAN states.87 It is important to note that this lack 
of engagement cannot necessarily be attributed solely to ASEAN countries’ action or inaction. In 
particular, the backlogs of treaty bodies are due to limitations of the system itself, despite numerous 
discussions, reports and attempts at reform.88 Moreover, it is also recognised that different member 
states in the region engage differently with the system, exemplified by the differing levels of 
ratification.  
We recognise that as Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch suggest, a valid distinction can be made 
between push back in the sense of trying to nudge the direction of an institution and push back in 
the sense of  a ‘backlash’ challenging the authority of an international (human rights) body. 89 We 
suggest that the relative lack of engagement amongst ASEAN nations is a result of tensions that exist 
between ASEAN, ASEAN states and the international system as each purport to understand human 
rights. The discussion focuses on ASEAN particularism, the principle of non-interference promoted 
by the region, and of the prevalence of national law. We suggest further that these principles, which 
are deeply embedded in the regional framework, help to explain ASEAN state’s reluctance to fully 
engage with the international human rights system. After identifying these areas of opposition, we 
map various theories which purport to explain how, notwithstanding these areas of push back, 
states can and are compelled to comply with international human rights law. Importantly, we 
consider these theories not only in light of ASEAN push back but also in the broader context of 
opposition to rights within which the relationship between ASEAN and the UN must be situated. 
Examining both together helps to elucidate the extent of the push back against contemporary 
international human rights law and the likelihood of continuing opposition to the global rights 
regime. 
(i) ASEAN Particularism 
Despite the examples of universal rights included in the ASEAN Charter and ADHR, the region’s 
states advocate particularism or cultural relativism in the form of deference given to national and 
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 See, for a useful discussion, Alison Duxbury and Hsien-Li Tan, Can ASEAN Take Human Rights Seriously? (Cambridge 
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 Philip Alston (ed), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Clarendon Press 1992); Navanethem Pillay 
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 Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak & Micha Wiebusch, ‘Backlash against international courts: explaining the forms and 
patterns of resistance to international courts’, (2018) 14 International Journal of Law in Context 197. 
15 
 
regional particularities. Inherent in this approach is an attempt to differentiate the region from the 
‘West’ and the application of universal rights and values in context.90 The ADHR reflects these 
sentiments. For instance, article 7 of the ADHR starts with a traditional restatement of the 
universality of human rights: ‘All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated.’91 However, further on in the same article comes the provision stating that ‘at the same 
time, the realization of human rights must be considered in the regional and national context 
bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious 
backgrounds.’92  This reflects the decision of Asian governments gathered to pass the Bangkok 
Declaration of 1993, which in the era of the Vienna World Conference on human rights, sought to 
dilute universality by reference to national and regional influences:93 While human rights are 
universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of 
international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities 
and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.94 Malaysia and Singapore spearheaded the 
focus on Asian values in the 1990s, seeking to emphasise commonalities in the region.95 For 
Ramshaw then, Article 7 of the AHRD is best read as a middle path between the 1967 ASEAN 
Bangkok and 1993 UN Vienna Declarations.96 
Social harmony, collective socio-economic prosperity in a then booming southeast Asia and an 
emphasis on communitarianism and respect for authority characterised the conceptualisation in the 
Declaration. The insertion of the aforementioned caveat on ASEAN particularism is directly related 
to the region’s history. An outcome of its periods of colonialism and imperialism has been the 
promotion of Asian Values rather than those of Western or Eurocentric ideals. Central to the Asian 
Values concept is the deconstruction of Universalist Western Values by creating a hierarchy of and 
prioritizing rights (namely economic over political and social) behind a façade built around cultural 
relativism.97  According to Uyen Le, Asian values were consolidated in this declaration reformulating 
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 For example, during the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Atalas argued that ‘(...) 
Indonesian culture was not as individualistic as the West's and that this had consequences for human rights, democracy 
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human rights ‘to privilege the state over the individual’ and emphasised ‘the need for respect for 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity’.98  
Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the concept almost disappeared from discussions. The Asian 
values argument has been reinvigorated in recent years, for instance through the return to power of 
Mahathir Mohammed in Malaysia in 2018.  He was a leading proponent in the 1990s.99 Cultural 
exceptionalism was the term frequently considered in human rights, especially ‘American 
Exceptionalism’ much discussed this century after the USA invaded Iraq in 2003.100 As noted above, 
China has also advocated an approach to human rights taking cognisance of the path of 
development of each state, and recognising discrete approaches, rather than a universalist 
approach.101 
Particularism is also advocated when accounting for differences that exist within the region. A 
favourite phrase in the region is ‘unity in diversity’ implying a variety of cultures, religions and 
polities in the region under one umbrella. The mantra reflects the fact that within ASEAN, there are 
notable differences and that ‘human rights are shaped by each society’s specific history, traditions, 
cultures and religions’.102 Politically, for instance, ASEAN states range across military rule (Thailand), 
socialist one party rule (Viet Nam), constitutional monarchy (Cambodia), absolute monarchy (Brunei 
Darussalam),  populist rule (the Philippines) and emergent democracies (Myanmar); dominant 
religions include Buddhism (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand), Islam (Brunei Darussalam, 
Indonesia, Malaysia) and Christianity (the Philippines); ethnicities are even more diverse though it is 
also noted that several minorities and indigenous peoples live across border areas. The region 
includes the most populous Muslim state in the world - Indonesia - and the three countries in the 
world with the largest percentage of the population identifying as Buddhist – Myanmar, Cambodia 
and Thailand.  Renshaw traces the evolution of ASEAN as a geographical entity, examining positively 
the success of maintaining the organisation despite the vastly different political positions, religious 
backgrounds and histories.103 
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The specific content of reservations to international treaties helps to demonstrate their use in 
limiting the universal nature of rights in favour of more a context specific approach drawing on the 
differences highlighted above. Brunei Darussalam’s reservation to the CRC, for instance, states that: 
‘The Government of Brunei Darussalam expresses its reservations on the provisions of the said 
Convention which may be contrary to the … beliefs and principles of Islam.’104 Thus, one of the 
reasons that ASEAN states might be reluctant to engage with the international system is that it 
promotes universal values, norms that run contrary to those developed out of the region’s history 
and beliefs. These fundamental differences have also meant opposition to mechanisms such as UN 
treaty bodies, which necessarily seek to promote compliance with international human rights law. 
(ii) Prevalence of national law 
ASEAN also shows a preference for national law, subordinating international law in the process. In 
theory, through ratification of international human rights treaties, Governments undertake to put 
into place domestic measures and legislation compatible with their treaty obligations and duties. 
The domestic legal system, therefore, provides the principal legal protection of human rights 
guaranteed under international law. This, of course, necessarily restricts the ability of governments 
to enact policies and laws that it sees fit and which are regarded as a direct expression of 
sovereignty and independence. ASEAN states nevertheless promote domestic law as superior. For 
instance, the AHRD contains many references to the role of national law, security, and morality in 
limiting the enjoyment of rights. In particular, article 8 provides that the exercise of rights shall be 
subjected to limitations only as determined by law, and to meet the just requirements of ‘national 
security, public order, public health, public safety, [and] public morality.’105  
ASEAN states frequently invoke the primacy of their Constitution or of their national laws in cases of 
conflict with treaty articles, reducing to nil the effectiveness of treaties in the domestic legal order. 
In addition, such states as Indonesia evidence the absence of domestic legal rules specifying the way 
that international law, once ratified, enters into force in the Indonesian legal system.106 This type of 
behaviour, according to the International Federation for Human Rights, is incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaties and with the logic underpinning international law and its 
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relationship with national law.107 Once again, reservations to international treaties offer useful 
insights in to the ways that international law is restricted. In the case of Malaysia, its reservation to 
CRC notes that:  
The Government of Malaysia accepts the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child but expresses reservations with respect to articles 2, 7, 14, 28 paragraph 1 (a) and 37, 
of the Convention and declares that the said provisions shall be applicable only if they are in 
conformity with the Constitution, national laws and national policies of the Government of 
Malaysia.108 
Similar reservations are submitted from Singapore and Thailand. Nicholas Doyle points out that 
using national laws in this way would undermine a state’s compliance with the obligations contained 
in international human rights treaties.109 Yet, examples abound of this in practice: Thailand’s lese 
majesty laws (Article 112 of the Criminal Code of Thailand) have been invoked repeatedly over 
recent years; in Indonesia an increasing range of laws are deployed to restrict legitimate freedom of 
expression. Laws are increasingly deployed to restrict the activities of human rights defenders 
throughout the region. Rather than partnering civil society organisations, ASEAN states have joined 
the global trend towards new registration and regulation laws for civil society organisations and 
NGOs.110  Singapore and Malaysia still have strong laws that limit certain freedoms, including the 
Internal Security Societies Act. Although Malaysia replaced this with Security Offences (Special 
Measures) Act 2012, the function is similar. The Act aimed to protect the state from political 
instability, but it can be used to detain opposition leaders criticizing the government.111  Across the 
region, as the world, the SARS-CoV-2  pandemic has resulted in emergency laws being enacted 
and/or activated, elements of which are, or have the potential to, restrict opposition, expression and 
demonstrations.112 
National law, when used in this way, can be seen as a way to limit the application of human rights 
law. International human rights law, which seeks to influence what a state can and cannot do, 
therefore, is viewed as an affront to national sovereignty and the right of domestic governments to 
enact their own laws, in line with the particularities of the country in question. The salience attached 
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to national law over international law is again a response to periods of the region’s colonial past. As 
Chesterman notes, it results from ‘the experience of colonialism *where+ for centuries, international 
law helped justify foreign rule, later establishing arbitrary standards of ‘civilization’ that were 
required in order to gain meaningful independence.’113 It is an attempt to safeguard national 
sovereignty in the face of international norms which seeks to restrict what a particular government 
can and cannot do. 
(iii) Sovereignty and Non-interference  
A third reason that helps explain the limited engagement of ASEAN states with the international 
human rights system is the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs.114 Non-confrontation is 
frequently described as the Asian approach to international relations par excellence. It is based on 
the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, which in turn is linked to the Westphalian 
notion of sovereignty. The non-interference doctrine is sacred and very rarely questioned, even in 
cases of serious human rights violations involving foreign nationals. PR China has also proven a vocal 
proponent, including at the UN Security Council during discussions on responsibility to protect and 
humanitarian intervention.115 
The importance attached to cooperation rather than non-interference is particularly obvious when 
examining the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). As noted, the AICHR 
was inaugurated in 2009 with powers that include public-awareness raising of human rights; 
capacity building; encouragement of accession to human rights treaties; promotion of human rights 
implementation; provision of advisory services; preparation of research studies; promotion of 
common approaches; preparation and submission of annual reports to the ASEAN.  However, unlike 
other regional mechanisms (OAS, Council of Europe, African Union), AICHR does not have the means 
to hold states to account. It lacks the mandate to receive complaints, address country situations, 
offer redress, and call for accountability. The trend of these mechanisms is to concentrate on 
cooperative programming on the promotion of rights pertaining to various groups, such as women, 
children, persons with disabilities, and victims of natural disasters. Again, the particular non-
confrontational approach adopted by ASEAN emanates from its history and foundational principles 
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of non-interference and respect for state sovereignty.  As noted, several of the member states have 
experienced not only periods of colonisation, but periods of internal and cross border conflict. Some 
have been ruled by at times oppressive use of force.  Against this backdrop, ASEAN states have 
sought to vehemently protect hard-won independence by promoting non-interference in internal 
affairs.  
Across the region, a dualist approach to international law is common. Accordingly, international 
human rights treaties remain recognised at the international level but not necessarily enforceable 
directly at the national level. Some constitutions in the region, for example, that of Cambodia, do 
espouse an understanding of human rights drawn from the international treaties the country has 
accepted. Some countries are avowedly dualist in approaching international law, for example 
Malaysia.116 VietNam, in contrast, appears to follow a more monist approach. 
International human rights mechanisms, which necessarily entail outside actors interfering in the 
domestic affairs of ASEAN states are, therefore, fundamentally anodyne to the ASEAN way.117 These 
approaches place ASEAN on a collision course with international human rights law and help to 
explain the lack of engagement with the UN human rights machinery discussed in the previous 
section. There are, in addition, other examples of ASEAN reluctance to accept international 
oversight. For instance, Article 29 CEDAW states that ‘Any dispute between two or more States 
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present Convention which is not settled 
by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration…’. However, six 
states (Brunei, Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) have submitted reservations. 
This is similar to reservations in respect of art 30 of CAT where 4 out of 6 (Indonesia, Lao, Thailand 
and Vietnam) have issued reservations. According to Davies, the ‘presumptive deference towards 
the principle of non-intervention’118 is particularly important given that human rights, with their 
focus on the relationship between citizens and their governments, are directly related to domestic 
politics.’119 Thus, when considered in light of the region’s history and foundational principles, it is 
perhaps easier to understand the lack of engagement with such mechanisms as treaty body 
individual complaints mechanisms.  
Summing up ASEAN Push Back  
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While certainly not exhaustive, the above has sought to demonstrate several reasons for the relative 
lack of engagement by ASEAN states with the international human rights system. It is evident that 
the region has adopted a particular style of human rights, one that is deeply embedded in and 
reflective of the underpinning tenets of ASEAN as a regional institution.120 Principles of particularism, 
national law and non-interference seek to protect hard won independence and safeguard the 
regions values. For many, this symbiotic relationship between the foundations of ASEAN and the 
ASEAN system of human rights has prevented meaningful progress in the area of human rights. 
According to Jones: 
The problem with ASEAN’s structural configuration lay in its constitutive norms which at 
once strengthen and shield the state with regards to external actor’s latent interference 
while preventing a disparate collection of states from enacting meaningful internal change. 
This proceeds due to procedural norms of decision-making which were designed for nascent 
newly independent states in an environment entirely dissimilar from now.121  
While the particular approach to human rights in ASEAN is subject to much debate, it is nevertheless 
indisputable that these particularities mean that areas of divergence exist between it and the 
international human rights regime. When unpacked and examined from the perspective of the 
region’s histories, it is perhaps clear that opposition is deep-rooted. But it is the depth of opposition 
that raises a fundamental question- how or why might states be compelled to comply with 
international law and therefore their international human rights obligations? 
3.  Theories on state compliance with international human rights norms  
The above discussion has sought to demonstrate not only ASEAN opposition to international human 
rights mechanisms and norms, but also the reasons for the push back that exists. Central to this 
discussion is understanding the strength of opposition rooted as it is in the region’s history. How 
then can this be reversed? What are the incentives, pulls and pushes, that exist to inspire 
compliance particularly in those contexts where the international rights regime is opposed on 
ideological grounds? In order to understand how best to promote compliance with international 
human rights law, even in those contexts opposed to the underlying principles and machinery, 
scholars have developed a range of theories. From fields such as law, sociology, history and 
international relations, explanations rooted in neorealism, institutionalism, liberalism and 
acculturation have sought to explain how a range of actors incentivise, coerce, shame and persuade 
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states to adhere to international human rights norms. These theories offer potential answers for 
why ASEAN states, in spite of resistance, might yet comply with human rights.  
However, we suggest that these theories and their efficacy in explaining and promoting compliance 
in ASEAN States must be understand in their broader global context. As noted, literature on the 
‘post-human rights era’,122 also termed ‘The Endtimes of Human Rights’123 or ‘twilight of human 
rights law’,124 seeks to capture what some see as a crisis of the global human rights project.125 This  
‘crisis’ is multifaceted but stems, in part, from the ability of leaders to undermine the rights project 
by laying blame for much of the discontent felt at the foot of the rights movement. Governments are 
increasingly showing an aversion to globalisation and multilateralism,126 and in their place, 
promoting nationalism, state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Whereas once 
regarded as a normative good, some now view rights as part of a broader project of globalisation 
that has undermined prosperity, stifled opportunity and eroded national identity, amongst other 
things.  
This broader context of opposition bolsters South East Asian and indeed other states’ aversion to the 
global rights project further entrenching, and even justifying, the ASEAN-specific approach to human 
rights. These theories, therefore, cannot be examined in the abstract but must instead be explored 
in light of the tectonic shifts that have helped undermine the international human rights movement. 
The discussion below considers ASEAN’s position in light of these broader and deeper shifts at the 
global level. Based on these limitations, we then advance a non-exhaustive number of 
recommendations and ideas that might be adopted in order to support future compliance with 
international human rights norms.  
(i) ASEAN Opposition in the context of Democratic Backsliding 
Much existing literature identifies the importance of civil society actors and democratic institutions 
in promoting compliance with international human rights law and UN mechanisms. For instance, 
theories on liberalism focus on the ability of domestic bodies to mobilise opposition to repressive 
states.127 Some argue that ratification of international human rights treaties, as an example, occurs 
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more readily in democratic states because such states are more responsive to domestic groups.128 
Democratic indicators such as elections, civil society, National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and 
press freedom motivate leaders to respect the human rights of the populace, although this may be 
offset during periods of perceived threat.129 Others look at relationship between domestic and 
international civil society actors. As an example, the theory of transnational human rights advocacy 
networks (TANs) predicts that international human rights regimes can improve actual performance 
where such networks are strong.130 This theory draws on the role of domestic civil society actors but 
also explores the influence of international actors such as international NGOs (INGOs). These 
‘networks’ are said to consist of international human rights INGOs such as Amnesty International or 
Human Rights Watch,131 together with domestic NGOs and other civil society groups, parties, or the 
media committed to human rights. The effectiveness of such approaches lies in their ability to exert 
pressure on governments to comply with international standards.  
As developed above, the reality is that in several South East Asian states, the civil society space is 
shrinking. Treaty bodies and special procedures, as well as the Universal Periodic Review, have 
drawn attention to the shrinking civil society space in numerous reports.132 In terms of NHRIs, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have national human rights institutions with ‘A’ 
accreditation, Myanmar and Thailand have a ‘B’ graded institution.133 Other states do not have a 
Paris Principles compliant institution. Moreover, the space for democratic contestation is often 
restricted, again using law as a tool. For example, Cambodia has introduced new and amended 
existing political laws; new provisions were applied by the Supreme Court in 2017 to dissolve the 
then principal opposition party in November 2017 (prior to the 2018 general National Assembly 
election in July 2018) on grounds of planning a ‘colour revolution’ to overthrow the ruling party. In 
Thailand, following the 2014 coup and military rule, elections were held in 2019 with rules limiting 
political activities in place until close to election day and with laws limiting the power of large 
political parties. In other instances in the region, civil society groups that demonstrate opposition to 
the government of the day have been banned or significantly impeded, challenging in an era of 
widespread corruption charges. Malaysia’s former Prime Minister, for example, is implicated in the 
1MDB scandal, a contributing factor in him losing the 2018 election. The ongoing ‘war on drugs’ in 
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the Philippines continues to be challenging; with an OHCHR report thereon presented to the 
June2020 Human Rights Council.134 Beyond the region, changes in political representation are 
apparent including, in 2018, PR China’s National People’s Congress approved the removal of the 
two-term limit on its presidents; Xi Jinping could theoretically remain in power for as long as he 
wishes. 
These occurrences are not necessarily novel for the region. The difficulty is that whereas in the past, 
reducing the civil society space and rolling back on democratic freedoms were met with a degree of 
push back from the international community, today, countries that were once part of this push back 
are now adopting the same approaches. For instance, a number of countries have invoked 
disparaging terms to describe civil society organisations. The former British Prime Minister Theresa 
May has previously denounced ‘activist left wing human rights lawyers’ who dare to challenge British 
forces on alleged torture in Iraq.135 The same observation holds without difficulty with respect to 
Poland, Hungary, and other countries of Eastern Europe.136 For instance, Viktor Orbán’s “State of the 
Nation” called on Hungarians to ‘reject the fake civil society activists - fattened on their money - who 
want to tell us how to live and with whom, how to speak, and how to raise our children’.137  
Various leaders have also sought to utilise national law to recapture aspects of sovereignty that are 
perceived as being lost to the international sphere. Under a range of names - democratic backsliding, 
constitutional rot, democratic decay - scholars have noted the practice of leaders utilising the 
national legal space to undermine rights.138 Through incremental constitutional and legislative 
changes, domestic actors rescind the sovereign space of the legal process to draw back on liberal 
ideas that have permeated the domestic legal arena, justifying their actions by stoking and playing 
on fears. In much the same way that ASEAN countries seek to limit or manipulate the judiciary, other 
countries increasingly adopt similar strategies.  
Thus, despite the importance attached to civil society and domestic institutions in promoting 
compliance with international human rights law under various theories, a number of ASEAN 
countries are actively seeking to limit the space for doing so. They are not alone and other states, 
paradoxically previously part of the push back against ASEAN states, are adopting similar 
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approaches. This brings us on to a much broader issues of states pushing compliance with human 
rights on ASEAN states.  
(ii) Increasing Push Back against Multilateralism  
Other research focuses on the pulls and pushes for state compliance that emerge from 
multilateralism. Institutionalism maintains the realist view that states are generally self-interested 
and that the international realm is archaic.139 However, this school of thought contends that 
meaningful and lasting forms of cooperation are possible under the condition of anarchy.140 
Institutional Liberalism provides one basis for political authority, conceived as a ‘fusion of power and 
legitimate social purpose’.141 According to Zacher and Matthew, international cooperation is key to 
maximising benefits and minimising damage of interdependence between states, cooperation being 
crucial for realising human rights and freedoms.142 
Approached from a regime theory perspective, which Neumeyer notes can be understood as a 
refinement of institutionalism, international treaties are thought to create binding obligations on the 
ratifying parties, which countries aspire to honour.143 Parties to international treaties generally 
aspire to comply in the spirit of pacta sunt servanda, where ‘compliance is the normal organizational 
presumption’.144 As Hathaway acknowledges, treaties are generally complied with because of the 
‘rational utility-maximizing activity of states pursuing their selfinterest’ and so regimes encourage 
participation with a focus on longer rather than immediate goals.145 
For scholars of liberal institutionalism, state interests can be best pursued through cooperation in 
international organisations. The more that a state or region is embedded within the institution, the 
greater the pull to comply with their norms. In this way, states comply with institutional norms 
because they determine that doing so will be in their material interests. Perhaps it is telling that half 
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of ASEAN member states have not yet been candidates for Human Rights Council membership – 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Singapore.146 
As has been discussed above, ASEAN state’s engagement with UN mechanisms has been 
inconsistent and at times, overtly confrontational. In mapping ASEAN reluctance according to its 
history, the salience attached to regionalism and regional institutions over international multilateral 
organisations like the UN demonstrates the strength of push back that exists in the region. The result 
is the partial acceptance of treaties and the variations in deference offered to UN mechanisms. Such 
aversion is, however, not new. What is new is the broader push back against collective action that 
undermines arguments based on multilateralism and its supposed benefits more generally. The US, 
for instance, has been at the forefront of efforts to undermine the UN human rights machinery. 
Invoking the much-versed mantra of ‘Make America Great’, bilateralism is winning the day over 
multilateralism. President Trump directly attacked the Human Rights Council: ‘We get nothing out of 
the United Nations. They don’t respect us, they don’t do what we want, and yet we fund them 
disproportionately ...’.147 Rhetoric was followed in reality when the US withdrew from the Council in 
June 2018, its ambassador calling the organisation ‘a protector of human rights abusers and a 
cesspool of political bias’.148 Israel was a point of contention for the USA and has itself withdrawn 
from some Council processes, notably the working group of the second cycle of universal periodic 
review.149 PR China has sought to undermine the UN claiming criticisms of its human rights record is 
'politically driven'. It has blocked critical nongovernmental organizations and activists from attending 
UN forums while letting representatives of government-sponsored groups participate in them and 
speak widely. Moreover, these efforts to counter multilateralism are arguably supported by similar 
trends in regard to other multilateral fora. In the UK, governments have regularly threatened to 
repeal the Human Rights Act and with it the possibility of direct consideration of core human rights 
in national courts. Others, such as Russia and Poland, have ignored European Court of Human Rights 
judgements. In 2020 Poland indicated its intention to withdraw from the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence.150  Former 
President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, opted not to recognise the Inter-American Court of Human 
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Rights.151 Across Africa too, there is evidence of push back against the regional human rights 
mechanisms.152 Institutionalist arguments assume countries interpret inclusion in institutions will 
bring about benefits. Yet, in the current context, it seems less likely those institutionalism arguments 
hold the same sway as they once did.  
Thus, despite the importance attached to institutionalism as a viable factor in influencing state 
compliance with international human rights law and mechanisms, today ASEAN-specific opposition is 
strengthened by a wider trend away for multilateral co-operation. As part of this trend, 
institutionalism is arguably losing its force in promoting compliance.  
(iii) ASEAN Opposition in a Context of Changing Power  
Others focus more on the role of states in promoting compliance. In the context of ASEAN, 
irrespective of the strength of opposition, Western states, espousing the merits of international 
human rights standards, can find ways to promote compliance in the region. For example, realism in 
international relations posits that states are unitary, self-interested actors, operating in an anarchic 
global society.153 Scholars from the realist school of thought argue that states comply with 
international human rights law if it is in their self-interests to do so. This is often approached from 
the perspective of looking at the ways in which powerful states coerce weaker states to ratify 
treaties, often in the form of economic incentives. According to Avdeyeva, for instance, under the 
logic of coercion, states change the behaviour of other states not by altering their normative 
positions, but by changing their cost-benefit calculations.154 In this vein, Hathaway introduces the 
concept of ‘collateral consequences’, which she suggests arise when domestic and transnational 
actors premise their actions toward a state on the state's decision to accept or reject international 
legal rules.155 Magesan argues that there are significant economic returns to treaty ratification. 
Countries that participate in HRTs receive more foreign aid than those that do not,156 while 
Peeremboom has analysed the financial drivers in human rights performance.157 Posner, for his part, 
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advances the claim that developing nations ratify due to pressure from the West.158 In these 
examples, powerful, often Western states, seek to incentivise less powerful states to comply with 
international human rights standards.  
Alternatively, more powerful states and other actors can also seek to promote compliance with 
international human rights law through other means. ‘Naming and shaming’, for instance, is the idea 
that states can be ‘persuaded’ to comply with international human rights law by highlighting failures 
to do so in the past. The strategy of naming and shaming countries into compliance with 
international human rights obligations is designed to ‘shine a spotlight on bad behavior *in order to+ 
help sway abusers to reform’.159  Much extant work expects the policy to reduce repression because 
shamed states seek to get out of the unfriendly spotlight160 or are persuaded to adopt new norms 
respecting human rights.161 The central tenet of this model, according to Krommendijk, is that states 
are committed to maintaining their reputation for abiding by their international law obligations, 
because this ensures that other states will cooperate and enter into agreements with them in 
future.162 In practice it is a combination of leaders not wanting to ‘lose face’ internationally and 
wishing to posit their state as a global player/leader on the international stage.163 This resonates 
strongly within ASEAN, indeed elsewhere in Asia, as it is linked to long established practices of 
diplomacy and business with respect, hierarchy and honour deeply embedded.164 Different 
stakeholders and mechanisms can both directly and indirectly involve themselves in ‘naming and 
shaming.’ UN mechanisms, such as treaty bodies, special procedures and inquiry procedures, can be 
seen to directly name and shame countries. In addition, while a range of actors feed into the 
functioning of UN mechanisms, civil society organisations and even citizens can also use the work of 
treaty bodies as the basis for further shining a spotlight on apparent state failings.  Goodhart  
examines this regime concept of human right, concluding that ‘as the inter-state consensus on 
human rights unravels, the enforcement capacity of the Regime [including the UN mechanisms+ … 
atrophies’.165  
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Yet, in these theories, there is a distinct direction of travel, the existence of which is necessary for 
realism-based arguments to hold: powerful states seek to influence less developed states to adhere 
to those standards that the former seeks to advance on the latter. There is an assumption, however, 
that more powerful states prescribe to a set of norms and advance these ideas on a less powerful 
state through incentives of coercion. The reality is that superpowers are increasingly demonstrating 
a lack of regard for human rights. Again, the US offers a useful example. Rather than championing 
human rights, under President Trump there has been a systematic undermining of the rights of 
migrants, women, children and certain sections of the armed forces.  Such dynamics raise questions 
about who the shamers or persuaders are. Echoes of the post-colonial critique are reflected – Makau 
Mutua and his ‘Savages, Victims, Saviors’ metaphor.166  As Rodríguez-Garavito and Gomez highlight: 
In a multipolar world, the old ‘boomerang’ approach of appealing to Washington, London, or 
Geneva so that global north governments would pressure their global south counterparts to 
comply with international human rights standards [is] already losing its effectiveness. With 
populist leaders stoking nationalism and violating the basic rights of vulnerable groups, such 
as religious and racial minorities, both in the global north and global south, the limited 
effectiveness and legitimacy of naming and shaming strategies focused on the traditional 
centres of power have been further eroded.167 
In the post-human rights era, in other words, it is not longer to be assumed that Western states are 
in fact liberal, nor that they will endeavour to promote rights on other states. This undermines 
arguments that depart from a position which relies on this assumption.  
Moreover, other, less liberal, states are emerging as important international players, often guided by 
different normative agendas. China stands out as an important example. It has sought to downplay 
individual rights, emphasizing state-led development, national sovereignty, and non-intervention at 
the council. China’s first penned resolution, in 2017, for example, highlighted development while 
neglecting individual rights.168 Theories that seek to argue that powerful actors can incentivise, 
persuade or create a context where compliance is legitimate presuppose the existence of actors that 
advance international human rights norms. This is often not the case. Scholars have focused on the 
emerging global political marketplace of change. Here, according to Carothers and Samet-Marram, 
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the efforts of western democracies to ‘affect the course of political change’ around the work are less 
dominant than hitherto was the case.169 
In his paper on human rights and populism, Philip Alston captures this changing landscape in 
foreboding a coalition of the willing. He notes that ‘*T+he coalition will consist of governments of 
many different stripes which are keen to challenge and dilute existing human rights standards and 
especially to undermine existing institutional arrangements which threaten to constrain them in any 
way’.170 Theories such as realism and naming and shaming have sought to capture, quite rightly, a 
particular state in international affairs where human rights were largely uncontested as a valid moral 
framework. Today, however, tectonic shifts now undermine their relevance in a world of changing 
power where it is not as clear which states are persuading, incentivising, or coercing, nevermind 
what norms they are seeking to espouse.  
Thus, while in the past ASEAN opposition was met with a degree of resistance from other states, 
particularly those that utilised their relative economic and political influence to advance rights, in 
the post-human rights era, this strategy seems less likely. Rather, today, those powerful nations 
once responsible for promoting rights appear to be less willing to do so, leaving space for other, less 
liberal countries to promote their own agendas.  
(iv) ‘Glocal’ Challenges to the Persuasion of Norms and their Legitimacy  
Other theories focus less on coercion, domestic institutions, and/or international multilateral 
institutions and instead direct attention towards the altering of beliefs. According to norm-based 
approaches such as constructivism, countries support or oppose treaties on substantive grounds, 
and will only join those treaties that affirm their normative, cultural, or ideological commitments. 
Consider the view of  Finnemore: ‘*s+ocially constructed rules, principles, norms or behaviour, and 
shared beliefs may provide states, individuals, and other actors with an understanding of what is 
important or valuable and what are effective and/or legitimate means of obtaining those valued 
goods.’171 Given the salience attached to treaty content, norm-based approaches to treaty 
membership place less emphasis on formal enforcement measures.172 Genuine treaty commitments, 
Cole notes, render provisions designed to enforce, coerce, or evade compliance unnecessary 
because ‘true believers’ comply even in the absence of such measures.173 However, a common 
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perspective on values and norms amongst states is not presumed. Instead, constructivists highlight 
the importance of persuading states to accept the normative content of human rights treaties. 
Persuasion can be described as a process of social learning, in which ‘actors are being convinced of 
the appropriateness and validity of new norms’174 or as ‘the active, often strategic, inculcation of 
norms’.175 In contrast to realist perspectives, which look to forms of coercion to impose a specific 
viewpoint on another state, constructivists are more concerned with facilitating a genuine change of 
perspective. The touchstone of this approach, as per Jinks and Goodman,176 is that actors are 
consciously convinced of the truth, validity, or appropriateness of a norm, belief, or practice. This 
poses some challenges when viewed in the context of ASEAN. As Davies comments, in line with 
constructivist arguments, ‘actors are convinced to adopt new standards because those new 
standards are thought to hold superior moral weight to the ones they are replacing’.177  
In the context of ASEAN, we have examined how states, as a result of their histories, promote 
particularism and prioritise national and regional context over the universal and global. Universalism 
runs contrary to these ideas and international human rights norms are perceived as an imposed 
Western idea. Given this deep-rooted stance on particularism, it is arguably unlikely that ASEAN 
states can be convinced of the appropriateness and validity of new norms’.178 Rather, what has 
emerged in the context of ASEAN is human rights with Asian characteristics. Moreover and as 
demonstrated above, with such states as the US drawing back on the salience attached to rights, it is 
less clear who these persuaders are.  
In response, others focus less on the act of persuasion and more on the sense of legitimacy that is 
gained by adhering to international standards. A growing interdisciplinary field introduces a 
mechanism of social influence known as acculturation, which has been described as ‘a process 
whereby actors respond to social and cultural pressures of a surrounding environment to formally 
assimilate other actors in a group’.179 At the core of acculturation is the contention that states, 
through interactions with other states and existing as members of a global society, come to the 
realisation of what is and is not acceptable behaviour. For some, governments might imitate the 
behaviour of other governments in order to deal with uncertainty in their environment. Even 
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without military or material pressures, governments might adopt a certain policy if they see that it 
works for other governments.180 For others, such as Simmons, compliance by a particular country is 
often associated with ratification by other countries within that country’s region.181  Certainly when 
reviewing international documentation on ASEAN states, there is some evidence of commonality. 
AICHR’s workplans could be viewed as fitting this theory, based as they are on areas of agreed 
common interest amongst the states. 
For the most part, the literature on acculturation centres on the issues of legitimacy and reputation. 
According to Jasper Krommendijk, states are committed to maintaining their reputation for abiding 
by their international law obligations and this ensures that other states will cooperate and enter into 
agreements with them in future.182 Wotipka and Tsutsui’s core argument is that if governments 
experience an acculturation process through which they recognize the legitimacy gain that treaty 
ratification produces, then we can better understand why so many of them ratify HRTs despite the 
sovereignty cost.183 They argue that the growing prominence of global human rights norms, which 
had become strong by the 1960s and have grown even stronger since, has had the effect of 
socializing states into ratifying international HRTs.184 The central component of these theories is that 
state determine that complying with international human rights law increases a state’s legitimacy. 
This then connects to other theories such as those of realism noted above.  
However, legitimacy is related to acceptance and acceptance presupposes a degree of consensus. 
For instance, drawing on insights from the institutionalist approach in sociology, Hafner-Burton and 
Tsutsui argue that states follow ‘global scripts’ in their search for legitimacy in international society 
and adopt globally legitimated policies and political structures somewhat independent of local 
environments.185 They continue that human rights ideas are certainly part of the ‘global script’ in the 
contemporary world, and ratification of HRTs increases the legitimacy of the state, thus leading to an 
isomorphic outcome: ratification by an overwhelming majority of the nation-states in the world. For 
Hill Jr then, the concept of legitimacy is intimately connected to the norm cascade process: when a 
sufficient number of states have adopted an international norm a kind of peer pressure emerges 
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that can coerce other states into adopting the norm, resulting in a ‘‘norm cascade’.186 Nielsen and 
Simmons suggest that in a global macrosociological context, treaty ratification may be viewed as one 
instantiation of a diffusing ‘logic of appropriateness’ that encourages governments to present 
themselves to the broader international community and to their own citizens as actors that affirm 
the basic rights of individuals.187  
But are these same arguments likely to hold in the current context where, for various reasons, 
human rights norms are increasingly presented as illegitimate? In other words, while theories on 
persuasion and acculturation presuppose an environment where countries assume complying with 
rights raises legitimacy, without the same consensus on the legitimacy that arises from adhering to 
international human rights law, is this really the case? The point is that constructivist arguments 
largely take as given the fact that human rights are perceived as legitimate and promoted by all 
states. The era of discontent with the global human rights project challenges that with the new 
coalitions of willing states opposed to rights are emerging.  
This question of legitimacy is equally true when we look from the bottom up. Theories on liberalism, 
for example, not only presuppose the existence of civil society. They also take as given that human 
rights are generally supported. According to Hill Jr, states that fail to abide by prevalent international 
norms risk losing the support of their citizenry, since citizens in modern states are likely to evaluate 
the performance of their government relative to the performance of other governments.188 He 
continues that, disturbed by the fact that their state is failing to provide a level of rights protection 
commensurate with that of other states, citizens will be less likely to comply with their government’s 
directives hence the government’s position in power will be weakened.189 Yet, populist leaders have 
shown themselves particularly skilled at attacking all aspects of the global, including human rights, 
and this is appearing to provide the basis for pushing back against the very idea of rights in some 
societies.  Fagan focuses on the persistent labelling of human rights and their defenders as ‘enemies 
of the people’ and the trend towards ‘right-wing political opportunists’ portraying as undemocratic 
support of rights of others, be they minorities or foreigners. 190 ‘Claiming to speak for “the people,” 
[populist leaders] treat rights as an impediment to their conception of the majority will, a needless 
obstacle to defending the nation from perceived threats and evils…’191 Kenneth Roth advances that 
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‘a growing number of people have come to see rights not as protecting them from the state but as 
undermining governmental efforts to defend them.192 
Opposition to the content of rights is, therefore, glocal in nature: it is global in emerging from states 
that are increasingly pushing back against the global rights regime, and at the same time local, with 
populations influenced by the rhetoric of elites who seek to perpetuate and manifest this sense of 
discontent.  
5. Responding: some recommendations  
The current focus of existing theories on compliance with international human rights law is to look 
retrospectively on what has gone before, assessing why states have been compelled to adopt 
treaties and enforce human rights standards and thus offer ways to ensure compliance in the future. 
Yet, the reality is that the current global context of opposition raises new issues, which may well 
undermine the efficacy of these theories. Powerful states are increasingly less likely to advocate 
human rights. The lack of consensus undermines persuasion and acculturation. The irrefutable 
supremacy of national law and sovereignty pushes back against international involvement. 
Discussions on ASEAN states and their relationship with UN mechanisms must, therefore, be 
understood in this broader context. As a case study, the region and the countries within it 
demonstrate the strength of the challenge faced - where once any opposition to the human rights 
project, particularly in what some see as its zenith, was met with resistance, increasingly the impact 
of that resistance is being eroded. But the real significance is to illustrate the broader challenge of 
human rights more generally.  
So, what are the opportunities for arresting the backsliding, re-establishing the era of rights and 
including all states in the global project? Fagan identifies that ‘[h]ow the human rights community 
addresses and answers this question will *…+ largely determine the fate of human rights in the 
proceeding decades of the twenty-first century.’193 If the human rights community fails to critically 
engage with the growing domestic challenges that it confronts, ‘it is highly likely that it will 
experience the same fate as that which appears to await other constituents of what is cast as the 
liberal elite; an unedifying descent into a socially exclusive, politically unpopular credo for a 
diminishing number of supporters, with ever diminishing influence beyond their own social 
enclaves.’194 César Rodríguez-Garavito and Gomez have noted this current crisis could have 
unexpected positive effects by pushing the human rights movement to make changes in its 









architecture and strategy that while imperative before, are urgent now.195 This mirrors the view of 
Strangio that ‘With authoritarian politics on the rise, now is the time … to adopt more pragmatic and 
flexible tactics for the advancement of human betterment.’196 Philip Alston argues that ‘human 
rights proponents need to rethink many of their assumptions’, reflect broadly then re-evaluate their 
strategies and outreach’.197 
According to these views, the current era of discontent is both a challenge and an opportunity where 
availing of the latter requires identifying and overcoming the former: ‘Developing this selfcritical 
understanding will require an acknowledgement of (and subsequent engagement with) deep 
internal shortcomings and limitation.’198 We suggest that with the shifting global context, existing 
theories on compliance become grand theories- abstract. The final section of this paper suggests 
that what is required is to focus on more specific aspects that emerge from the limitations of existing 
explanations. Thus, we offer a number of modest proposals not as a failsafe panacea, but as a 
necessary conversation starter.  
(i) Focus on (re)building up civil society  
Civil society organisations play a critical role in protecting and promoting rights. For instance, in 
regards to the development of human rights in the region, scholars such as Duxbury and Tan argue 
that the gradual improvements in the human rights records of ASEAN states was attributable, in 
part, to the push by civil society and the international community for norms of human rights and 
democracy to be implemented.199 Nevertheless, because civil society groups are increasingly 
silenced or scared into some form of submission, the potential to influence the update of human 
rights is often significantly constrained. Building local civil society space through, for instance, 
technical and legal assistance is a necessary first step.  When civil society is able to function and 
flourish, governments can be held to account and pressure to comply with international human 
rights norms can be exerted. 
Within the UN itself, engagement with civil society has become more pronounced: shadow reports 
to treaty bodies are almost standard; civil society participates in the UPR at the adoption stage;200 
and there is widespread engagement with the salient reports of special procedures. Impetus for 
greater prominence for civil society can also be garnered through the UN Sustainable Development 
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Goals in pursuance of Agenda 2030. This can be useful in the South East Asian context as the SDGs 
are relatively non–controversial with all the region’s states engaged in pursuing their localisation 
plans. The UN sustainable development goals are predicated on partnerships, inter-state at the 
international level and with a range of entities at the national level.  Civil society has a strong role to 
play, both in terms of participation and for accountability. This entails, or should entail, engagement 
with civil society during the drafting of the localisation plans and their participation in the realisation 
of the resultant plan. Civil society are envisioned in SDG17 as being a key partner of government in 
the realisation of the goals. Indeed, they represent a major source of intelligence on who might be 
left behind during the development process, important when many countries in the region are 
undergoing very rapid development and change.  Civil society organisations with strong grass roots 
networks are ideally placed to aid the government in identifying vulnerable groups and remediating 
the vulnerabilities. Moreover, engagement with civil society organisations can be crucial for 
delivering development projects at the local level. Civil society organisations also have a role to play 
in holding the government accountable for its progress, or lack thereof, against the SDGs.  
In the UPR reports of ASEAN states, it is clear that areas regularly commented on across all or most 
states include judicial processes, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and of association. 
However, as Ramcharan and Gomez argue, there is a gap in the protection of many of these rights in 
the region and the UPR cycles did little to engage with expressed civil society concerns.201 Their 
stakeholder analysis on engagement of civil society found worrying gaps in the substantive areas 
covered across the region’s reviews.202 There are similar difficulties at the regional level, 
demonstrating the need for further efforts to facilitate cooperation with civil society actors. For 
instance, an in-house assessment by the ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN Peoples’ Forum 
(ACSC/APF) concluded that in the ten years of engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) from 2005 to 2015, “individual ASEAN member countries have consistently resisted 
and vacillated with regards civil society participation and engagement.”203 It should be noted that 
positive steps were taken with the publishing of Guidelines On The AICHR’s Relations With Civil 
Society Organisations. Nevertheless, differences continue regarding expectations: while ASEAN often 
expects civil society to support ASEAN decisions, civil society organisations wish to have a larger role 
in consultation and decision-making processes. In addition, there may well need to be change within 
civil society organisations and collaboration themselves. Instead of joining the lobby to the ASEAN 
government, civil society organisations like Kontras, along with other human rights groups, joined 
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the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia), where they fostered solidarity 
among NGOs to protest human rights abuses by ASEAN states. Moving forward, strengthening 
cooperation between civil society groups and ASEAN could be vital for progressing human rights in 
the region.  
Domestically, a greater role for civil society and more attention to human rights is further limited by 
the diversity of national positions, since ASEAN governs by consensus and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of one another. Registration, political neutrality and a myriad of other requirements 
combine to restrict work at national levels. The laws are frequently applied in a restrictive rather 
than a positive way. Reinvigorating the protection and promotion of civil society and civil society 
partnerships with government will not be popular but harnessing some civil society efforts will reap 
dividends for states. Thus, in seeking to advance human rights more generally, targeting regressive 
actions on the civil space could serve as a prelude to opening up a primary channel for the 
advancement of rights by enabling civil society actors to promote adherence to human rights.  
It should be noted that some progress is being made in this area.204  Nevertheless, the point remains 
that for the practical application of theories grounded in liberalism to ring true, more efforts, by 
national, regional and international actors to strengthen the capacity of civil society is one area that 
could counteract the growing opposition to rights.  
(ii) Focus more on human rights education  
Much opposition to rights is emerging as a result of populist rhetoric. As noted, populist leaders 
mischaracterise rights in ways that promote rights as constituting part of the problem for 
unemployment, the rights of migrants and terrorist. Presented as such, the same leaders are able to 
garner broad opposition to rights, such that any changes to law that draws rights back is welcomed. 
Unchallenged, this is likely to continue. There is more of a need for human rights education to 
explain what they are and why they are important. In particular, countering the characterisation of 
rights as adverse to society is central to ensuring that rights do not continue to be viewed in 
disparaging terms. Within the UN, this evolves around the World Programme for Human Rights 
Education.205  The first phase of the World Programme (2005–9) sought to infuse human rights in all 
educational processes while practising human rights within the national education systems of States, 
the second phase extended to government and other officials directly impacting on rights as well as` 
other levels of education, the third phase (2015-2019) consolidated the previous phases and focused 
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on engaging media professionals and journalists and the fourth phase206 focuses on youth (2020-
2024).  
The primary problem with human rights education in ASEAN is the emerging politicisation of human 
rights. This can stigmatise human rights, limit human rights education and training (as noted above 
with the pressure on some civil society organisations) and even restrict engagement with 
international human rights in schools and universities.207 Human Rights language is not the preserve 
of those opposing government, rather it should be the language of everyone.  Yet around the region, 
journalists are being arrested, human rights defenders threatened and many training activities 
monitored. Perhaps strengthening protection of freedom of assembly, expression and association 
could be a useful starting point for collaboration alongside reclaiming respect, promotion and 
protection of human rights as the primary duty of the state. This would also support the 
reinvigoration of civil society.  
To this end, some notable developments are underway in the region. Some scholars have 
documented early efforts to promote human rights education in schools.208  In 2019, Human Rights 
and Peace Education Programme for Universities in ASEAN was formally acknowledged at the ASEAN 
Education Ministers Meeting (ASED). Beyond this, there is a broad range of human rights 
organisations working throughout the region that earnestly seek to promote awareness and 
understanding. Nevertheless, while notable, the point remains that focusing more on the 
foundations of human rights education, particularly within and by ASEAN governments, could serve 
as a stepping stone to countering the strategies of populist leaders to mischaracterise rights in ways 
that increases opposition and thus undermines efforts to promote them. These steps are, in some 
senses, the foundations upon which liberal theories and those on transnational advocacy networks 
(TANs) depend. 
(iii) Identify and focus on areas for collaborations 
While the international system of human rights can be viewed as confrontational and as potentially 
at odds with the foundations of ASEAN, there are nonetheless opportunities for developing more 
collaborative and region-sensitive approaches. While some might regard softer approaches as a 
capitulation and contrary to universalism, we suggest that such opposition fails to adequately 
recognise the strength of opposition to rights in the region.  
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In terms of identifying areas of potential synergy and cooperation, the work plans and modalities of 
AICHR offer a potential way to develop further collaborative approaches to human rights issues. 
Where national interests coincide, progress remains possible and indeed appears supported by 
states. There are clearly some areas of commonality between the identified regional and 
international ‘hot points’, including between the AICHR workplan priority areas and the topics 
identified in the UN treaty body and universal periodic review processes. Consensus on trafficking is 
evident and perhaps unsurprising. Southeast Asian countries are both origin and destination 
countries of human trafficking. Progress has been marked with a Convention agreed and in force,209 
supported by a Plan of Action210 which identifies common challenges in ASEAN member states 
including the need to alleviate the factors making persons vulnerable to trafficking, the need for 
appropriate legislation and protection measures, the need to improve prosecution and investigation 
of traffickers and the problems caused by the lack of regional legal and other mechanisms to further 
cooperation.211 The factors making persons vulnerable to trafficking include government corruption, 
poverty, different levels of social economic development as well as inefficient law enforcement and 
legal systems.212  These are all areas which have been picked up in treaty body and UPR reviews. The 
plan of action proceeds to commit contracting states to a series of reforms which should address 
these concerns. The vehicle is the national action plans which each contracting state prepares, with 
Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) overseeing implementation.  
Migration is another common theme and likely to remain so with greater economic integration in 
ASEAN and the planned internal visa free travel zone. A 2012 agreement sought to facilitate the 
movement of persons in the region.213  Many ASEAN states share land borders with other ASEAN 
states.214 Many areas are transboundary, and some borders are relatively porous to goods and 
persons, so demands regional response. For ASEAN to harness the potential of its people in a 
positive manner, it is essential that migration is addressed as a regional issue, and care is taken to 
consider the plight of the large number of undocumented migrants moving between states. This is 
particularly so given that the ASEAN Declaration permits states to exclude non-nationals from the 
protection of economic and social rights inscribed in the Declaration.215 Thailand and Cambodia have 
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maintained bilateral discussions to resolve the situation of Cambodian undocumented migrants in 
Thailand and authorities and civil society organisations cooperate with the transfer of migrants at, 
for example, Poipet. Of course, in 2020, the spread of Covid19 has increased border restrictions 
amongst ASEAN states.216 
With region wide ratification of CRC and CEDAW, it is unsurprising that women and children have 
also been a focus. The AICHR workplans include a programme of activities for sharing and 
documenting experiences across states and potentially this can lead to more concrete assistance and 
pooling of resources. In 2010, ASEAN established the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) .217 Its twenty members are split between 
those representing women and those representing children (each category has one member per 
member state).  Its terms of reference are rights focussed, drawing on the UN treaties and platforms 
for action.218 This clearly resonates with the work of AICHR. Moreover, the Commission appears 
bound to uphold the relevant UN conventions. Article 30(3) of the ASEAN Declaration provides that 
motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance in the context of social 
protection, whilst Article 27(3) proscribes the economic and social exploitation of children. To date, 
the commission has chosen to take on board these issues, issues which are also prominent on the 
international stage. It has adopted Recommendations of the Regional Workshop on Promoting the 
Right to a Nationality for Women and Children in the Implementation of CEDAW and CRC in 
ASEAN219 and Recommendations of the Regional Workshop on Promoting the Rights of ASEAN 
Women and Children through Effective Implementation of the Common Issues in CEDAW and CRC 
Concluding Observations with Focus on Girl Child,220 the latter clearly drawing on international 
human rights law in a regional context. Violence against women and girl children has also been 
considered, a topic prominent on the international stage.221 Trafficking in women and children has 
been a priority. The ACWC has also completed a Regional Review on Laws, Policies and Practices 
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within ASEAN relating to the Identification, Management and Treatment of Victims of Trafficking, 
especially Women and Children.222 
It is clear that when there is willingness to work together towards a solution to identified problems, 
then progress can be made. Like international human rights generally, success depends on the 
willingness of states to engage in open discussions at the inter-governmental level. Thereafter, 
progress is dependent on the national level. Topics selected by AICHR necessarily focus on those 
areas in which consensus is present. For some commentators, this indicates a lack of teeth, a 
softness, with hard challenging issues being, in effect sidelined.  
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration preambular paragraphs assert the intention of the Heads of 
State/Government that the Declaration ‘will help establish a framework for human rights 
cooperation in the region and contribute to the ASEAN community building process’. AICHR’s first 
workplan produced steps towards this, particularly through identifying areas for thematic studies. 
However, studies, like action plans, mean little to those most affected by human rights 
infringements. There is concern in the literature over the perceived lightweight monitoring of human 
rights in ASEAN itself. Jetschke noted in 2009, for instance,  the parallels between the planned 
development of ASEAN and that of the European Community/Union, critiquing the ‘lightweight’ 
institutions in ASEAN.223  Others, perhaps correctly, continue to lament the primary focus of 
promoting, rather than protecting, human rights.224 
Nevertheless, there is some value in a regional overview of the current status of human rights and of 
national laws and policies pertaining to specific issues. One such approach, as posited by Duxbury 
and Tan, is to utilise the UPR process as a way of identifying pressing issues to be addressed in the 
region.225 Through their analysis of UPR reports, they highlight such issues as the rights of women 
and children, economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights in particular ASEAN 
states. The next step of concretizing the documentation of status quo and national laws is, 
inevitably, sharing good practices and developing higher levels of protection. What is required within 
ASEAN is something more than discussion on these issues. More training (some of which has been 
undertaken already) and analysis of root causes of persistent and widespread violations (eg 
migration and trafficking) could help strengthen human rights in ASEAN. Thus, examined through the 
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lens of specific issues, it is apparent that the work of ASEAN and the international human rights 
system can be mutually reinforcing. When framed in these cooperative terms, the two systems 
support rather than contradict each other in pursuance of common objectives.  
(iv) Focus on being persuasive 
In ways, the above all focus on changing tact from promoting confrontational approaches, whereby 
actors seek to coerce or persuade compliance with international human rights norms to instead 
adopting more targeted approaches. As Alston notes, ‘we need to acknowledge the need to devote 
more time and effort to being persuasive and convincing, rather than simply annunciating our 
principles as though they were self-evidently correct and applicable.’226 In South East Asia, this 
approach could certainly reap dividends. 
As noted above, persuasion relies on achieving a change in outlook whereby one set of norms- in 
this case universal rights are perceived as superior to another- in ASEAN’s case human rights with 
ASEAN characteristics. However, this is not to say that persuasion, in certain contexts, cannot be of 
some use. Universal periodic review within the Human Rights Council would, at first glance, appear 
amenable to the ASEAN emphasis on non-interference in states’ internal affairs and diplomatic 
persuasiveness. Inherently peer focussed, positive comments characterise many interventions, 
especially during the interactive dialogues of the working group sessions. The Philippines and 
Indonesia were the first states in the region to be reviewed.227 Writing on the Indonesian experience 
of two cycles of review, Wahyuningrum is sceptical of the real impact on the ground of the process, 
considering it more a ‘routine exercise’.228 Certainly, looking across the reviews in the ASEAN region, 
it is evident that improvements on, or changes in light of, previously accepted recommendations 
have not characterized the second, or indeed third, cycle. Whilst individual state presentations have 
highlighted improvements made, some commentators on the universal periodic review process 
allege it is a meaningless process229 with states supporting each other rather than engaging in more 
objective evaluation and rigorous analysis. Certainly, when ASEAN states contribute views on other 
ASEAN states, comments are generally positive and supportive.  
The UPR dialogue of every ASEAN state involved comments and recommendations on women and 
children, most involved discussions on persons with disabilities. Admittedly, those categories are 
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commented on in virtually every UPR, the ASEAN states are not unique in this respect.  For persons 
with disabilities, many of the comments are positive, supportive of activities. Mathew Davies notes 
with respect to the region’s initial UPR reports on women, there are two particular clusters of issues: 
around religion and around institutionalized patriarchy.230  The latter can certainly be addressed in 
part through education and awareness raising; the former can be more challenging in several 
countries. There is certainly scope for AICHR to raise the profile of institutionalized patriarchy in the 
region and work on combatting cultural norms. As for children, comments were made on a number 
of topics. Challenges combatting trafficking in children and the sexual and economic exploitation of 
children were common themes across ASEAN universal periodic review reports with many states in 
the second and third cycles noting the progress being made by ASEAN states. The fact that several 
states had ratified (or removed reservations to) the second Optional Protocol on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and child pornography was favourably received.231 Of course, many of these issues 
fall within the AICHR workplans and indeed, a treaty evolved.232 Nevertheless, some, like 
Dominguez-Redondo see the UPR and its cooperative approach as a useful mechanism in advancing 
rights in the region, particularly given its non-confrontational approach.233   
Conclusion  
This paper has sought to examine the implications of the post-human rights era on those contexts 
that have historically shown an aversion to the global rights project. ASEAN states, for numerous 
reasons, have presented a degree of opposition to international human rights law. Whereas in the 
past, such opposition was met with a degree of push back, in today’s context, ASEAN opposition is 
increasingly bolstered by states presenting similar concerns and strategies. This, we suggest, raises 
questions regarding the ways in which scholars have suggested states are convinced to comply with 
international human rights treaties. These uncertainties are pertinent not just to ASEAN but to all 
countries where existing to opposition to rights is finding support amongst countries previously 
supportive of rights.  
Nevertheless, whilst undoubtedly this is a period of push back, of challenges to the prevailing 
international human rights project, there are opportunities. Opportunities to divert efforts into 
rebuilding human rights civil society groups, reinvigorating human rights education in the broad 
sense, driving through changes in areas of common interest and focussing on persuasion. The 
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problem is multi-faceted, its underpinning reasons myriad, so a multipronged solution, drawing on 
strengths is called for. The suggestions advanced in this paper are merely that. They are intended to 
serve as the beginning of a conversation, one that examines regional opposition in light of broader 
and global shifts and which begins to look for response that are grounded, first and foremost, in 
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 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
235
 Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture 
236
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
237
 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming to the abolition of the death penalty 
238
 Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
239
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
240
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
241
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
242
 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
243
 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
244
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict 
245
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children child prostitution and child pornography 
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Table 2: Acceptance of individual complaints procedures 











X X X X X X X X X 
Cambodia  X X X 13 Oct 2010 X X X X X 
Indonesia X X X X X X X X X 
Lao X X X X X X X X X 
Malaysia X X X X X X X X X 
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 Individual complaints procedure under the Convention against Torture 
248
 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
249
 Individual complaints procedure under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
250
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
251
 Individual complaints procedure under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
252
 Optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
253
 Individual complaints procedure under the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
254
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
255
 Optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
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Myanmar X X X X X X X X X 
Philippines X 22 Aug 1989 X 12 Nov 2003 X X X X X 
Singapore X X X X X X X X X 
Thailand X X X 14 Jun 2000 X X X 25 Sep 2012 X 
Vietnam X X X X X X X X X 
 
Table 3: Inquiry procedures 
 CAT, Art.20256 CED, Art.33257 CEDAW-OP, Art. 8-9258 CESCR-OP, Art.11259 CRC-OP-IC, Art.13260 CRPD-OP, Art.6-7261 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
NA NA X NA X X 
Cambodia  15 Oct 1992 27 Jun 2013 13 Oct 2010 X X X 
Indonesia 28 Oct 1998 NA X X X X 
Lao 26 Sep 2012 NA X X X X 
Malaysia NA NA X NA X X 
Myanmar NA NA X X X X 
Philippines 18 Jun 1986 NA 12 Nov 2003 X X X 
Singapore NA NA X NA X X 
Thailand 02 Oct 2007 NA 14 Jun 2000 X 25 Sep 2012 X 
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 Inquiry procedure under the Convention against Torture 
257
 Inquiry procedure under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
258
 Inquiry procedure under the Optional protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
259
 Inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
260
 Inquiry procedure under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
261
 Inquiry procedure under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
